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REPORT





DERHAPS it was just the presence of a legal press. Certainly the
American Lawyer, the National Law Journal, and other publica-
tions heightened our awareness of it. Whatever it was, the American
Bar Association Section of Litigation was concerned that far too many
examples of lawyer lapses were being reported. As Geoffrey Hazard
observed, these reports did not involve small practitioners in rural
towns who were barely eking out a living selling title insurance and
peddling real estate just to get by. No, these reports involved talented
partners at major establishment law firms in the nation's biggest cities.
Moreover, these reports did not involve close questions on some-
body's notion of what was professional. Rather, they involved clear
ethical violations for which our rules were certainly adequate, but
somehow not deterrent enough to prevent this unfortunate conduct.
This somewhat alarmist observation came together with an evolving
view that we as lawyers spend an enormous amount of time in a con-
scientious discussion of these issues, but that we were always talking
to each other. What might be required to really help us understand
our profession would be to go outside the lawyers' club and invite
sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists, and talented individuals
from other disciplines to observe us from their different perspectives.
Lawrence Fox, as incoming Chair of the Section, recruited Geoffrey
Hazard, Dean Peter Glenn from Dickinson College of Law, Douglas
Frenkel from the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and Nadia
Jannetta, Donald Hilliker, and Nancy Higgins from the American Bar
Association Section of Litigation leadership to plan the approach.
They, in turn, recruited our talented staff, including those whose pa-
pers you find here, as well as Renee Fox, a specialist on the medical
profession and a Professor of Sociology at the University of Penn-
sylvania, and Steve Priest, a well-known business ethicist. It was
Geoffrey Hazard's idea that we follow the format that had been so
successful in his earlier 1978 study, Ethics in the Practice of Law.' We
planned to invite the participants to two different sessions separated
by several weeks and, as Professor Hazard suggested, at the second
session the truth would come out.
1. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Ethics in the Practice of Law (1978).
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Initially, the group chose "Beyond Ethics" to be the title for the
project. That title, however, did not capture what we had in mind.
This was not to be a study of fuzzy and often unhelpful concepts of
professionalism. The title was changed to "Ethics: Beyond the Rules"
because our purpose was to help us understand why our ethics rules
were not being observed. Additionally, we wanted to ask what, be-
yond the rules, had to be addressed in order to get lawyers to conform
their conduct to the demands of the codes of conduct, and what pres-
sures and perceptions were causing the conduct that had triggered the
study. With the huge financial and psychological support of the Sec-
tion of Litigation and its Council from 1995-98 as well as financial
assistance from both the Philadelphia law firm Drinker Biddle &
Reath and the accounting firm Arthur Andersen, both of whom con-
tributed funds for travel and the small stipend we paid our scholars,
the project became a reality.
Our original concern was with the entire profession, not just litiga-
tion, and it involved a broad range of conduct, but everyone agreed
that the study would have to be narrowed if anything meaningful were
to be achieved. Not surprisingly, given the Section of Litigation spon-
sorship, we decided to focus on litigators and, in particular, the discov-
ery process. In reaching this conclusion as to focus, the project chose
to concentrate on an area whose roots go back nearly one hundred
years. In 1906, Roscoe Pound complained about the "sporting theory
of justice" in a speech entitled "The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction
with the Administration of Justice."2 Trial by ambush was the rule of
the day, with neither side required to turn over information to the
other prior to the trial. Thus, the United States Supreme Court
adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") in 1938, con-
cerned that truth and justice were better served when all the facts
came before the court and jury. FRCP Rule 26 and the accompanying
discovery rules were a dramatic change. The rules required both sides
to turn over information to each other in what has been described as
"a striking and imaginative departure from tradition."3
By 1947, the United States Supreme Court had declared in Hick-
man v. Taylor that "[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant facts gath-
ered by both parties is essential to proper litigation."'4 The Supreme
Court observed:
The pre-trial deposition-discovery mechanism established by Rules
26 to 37 is one of the most significant innovations of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the prior federal practice, the pre-
trial functions of notice-giving, issue-formulation and fact-revelation
were performed primarily and inadequately by the pleadings. In-
2. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration
of Justice, 29 A.B.A. Rep. 395 (1906).
3. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, 1970 advisory committee's note.
4. 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
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quiry into the issues and the facts before trial was narrowly confined
and was often cumbersome in method. The new rules, however, re-
strict the pleadings to the task of general notice-giving and invest
the deposition-discovery process with a vital role in the preparation
for trial .... Thus civil trial in the federal courts no longer need be
carried on in the dark. The way is now clear, consistent with recog-
nized privileges, for the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowl-
edge of the issues and facts before trial.5
In a later case, the Supreme Court commented that the discovery
rules are designed to "make a trial less a game of blindman's bluff and
more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the
fullest practicable extent."6
Yet from the beginning, the courts and the profession have grappled
with the anomaly of a disclosure system designed to bring out all rele-
vant information embedded in an adversary process where a lawyer's
first duty is to be the zealous advocate of the client. Clients' resist-
ance to disclosure of harmful information is no surprise. Their attor-
neys' use of analytical skills to fashion arguments supporting their
clients' view is also no surprise. They are zealous advocates first and
foremost.
These instincts, however, do not encourage a lawyer to volunteer
information harmful to her client's case. By the same token, use of
the discovery rules to make life difficult for the opponent is a natural
response to a perceived meritless claim or to demonstrate that it will
not be easy sledding against this lawyer and client. Should we expect
anything else from the zealous advocate? Over the years, the courts
and the profession have answered the question with a resounding
"yes." Courts have adopted rules to sanction lawyers and their clients
who abuse the system. Bar associations and state supreme courts
have adopted codes of ethics that prohibit lawyers from employing
dilatory and other tactics in the name of zealous advocacy.
Despite the seemingly clear direction from courts about how law-
yers must act in discovery, reported cases of misconduct continued to
appear. The lawyers involved have sometimes been from the largest
and most prestigious firms in the country. For example, in 1978, a
then-partner at New York's Donovan Leisure Newton & Irvine pled
guilty to criminal contempt for failure to produce documents in the
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Kodak Co.7 antitrust litigation.s
In the 1980s, court rules were tightened, and most states adopted
the American Bar Association's 1983 Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. Yet, discovery abuse continued to be reported in the press
5. Id. at 500-01 (footnotes omitted).
6. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958) (citing Hick-
man, 329 U.S. at 501).
7. 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).
8. See Kodak Case Attorney Pleads Guilty, Wash. Post, Sept. 22, 1978, at F5.
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and sometimes involved major law firms. In one instance, the Wash-
ington Supreme Court, in Washington State Physicians Insurance Ex-
change & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., rejected the argument of Seattle's
Bogle & Gates that it had acted properly in failing to produce key
documents.9 The firm argued, with support from a prestigious list of
ethics professors and practicing lawyers, that it had acted responsibly
because its narrow and misleading responses to discovery requests
simply reflected the way discovery was conducted in Seattle. 10
The Washington Supreme Court wrote that "[c]onduct is to be mea-
sured against the spirit and purpose of the rules, not against the stan-
dard of practice of the local bar."" The court noted that "[h]aving
read the record herein, we cannot perceive of any request that could
have been made to this drug company that would have produced the
smoking gun documents."' 2  The Washington Supreme Court
concluded:
[T]he drug company's attorneys claim they were just doing their job,
that is, they were vigorously representing their client. The conflict
here is between the attorney's duty to represent the client's interest
and the attorney's duty as an officer of the court to use, but not
abuse the judicial process.
[V]igorous advocacy is not contingent on lawyers being free to
pursue litigation tactics that they cannot justify as legitimate. The
lawyer's duty to place his client's interests ahead of all others pre-
supposes that the lawyer will live with the rules that govern the sys-
tem. Unlike the polemicist haranguing the public from his soapbox
in the park, the lawyer enjoys the privilege of a professional license
that entitles him to entry into the justice system to represent his
client, and in doing so, to pursue his profession and earn his living.
He is subject to the correlative obligation to comply with the rules
and to conduct himself in a manner consistent with the proper func-
tioning of that system.13
Only a few months earlier, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the imposi-
tion of sanctions against defense counsel in Malautea v. Suzuki Motor
Co.,14 and wrote:
All attorneys, as "officers of the court," owe duties of complete can-
dor and primary loyalty to the court before which they practice. An
attorney's duty to a client can never outweigh his or her responsibil-
ity to see that our system of justice functions smoothly. This con-
cept is as old as common law jurisprudence itself. In England, the
first licensed practitioners were called "Servants at law of our lord,
9. 858 P.2d 1054, 1083 (Wash. 1993).
10. See id. at 1078.
11. Id. at 1079.
12. Id. at 1084.
13. Id. (quoting William W Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-
A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 184 (1985)).
14. 987 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir. 1993).
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the King" and were absolutely forbidden to "decei[ve] or beguile
the Court." In the United States, the first Code of Ethics, in 1887,
included one canon providing that "the attorney's office does not
destroy . . . accountability to the Creator," and another entitled
"Client is not the Keeper of the Attorney's Conscience."
Unfortunately, the American Bar Association's current Model
Rules of Professional Conduct underscore the duty to advocate
zealously while neglecting the corresponding duty to advocate
within the bounds of the law. As a result, too many attorneys have
forgotten the exhortations of these century-old canons. Too many
attorneys, like defense counsel in this case, have allowed the objec-
tives of the client to override their ancient duties as officers of the
court. In short, they have sold out to the client.
We must return to the original principle that, as officers of the
court, attorneys are servants of the law rather than servants of the
highest bidder. We must rediscover the old values of our profes-
sion. The integrity of our justice system depends on it.15
It was against this backdrop that the project studied the issues of
litigators' discovery conduct today. As Professor Hazard predicted,
the truth did come out. Curiously enough, this truth arose not directly
from what any individual or group said, but from a comparison and
contrast of what different individuals and groups talked about and
omitted. We gained fascinating insight from Bob Nelson's "Circle of
Blame," in which each participant justifies his or her conduct, but
savages the conduct of others. 6 We observed a disjunction between
associates and partners, in-house and outside counsel, plaintiffs and
defendant's counsel, with the judges blaming everyone else and every-
one else claiming "if only the judges . . . ." Austin Sarat noted that
judges and lawyers all look at themselves as victims of forces over
which they have little or no control. He was struck by an absence of
"strategies for preserving or promoting professional values."' 7 Mark
Suchman as well reported that the profession's mechanisms for
"resolving ethical ambiguities and transmitting moral standards that
rise above the baseline rules" are increasingly inadequate.' 8 We
learned of Carla Messikomer's "rhetoric of ethics" that reflects the
ambivalence, contradiction and ambiguity of the profession.' 9 Robert
Gordon noted many possible causes for borderline levels of ethical
15. 1& at 1546-47 (footnotes omitted).
16. See Robert L. Nelson, The Discovery Process as a Circle of Blame: Institin-
tional Professional, and Socioeconomic Factors that Contribute to Unreasonable, Inef-
ficient, and Amoral Behavior in Corporate Litigation, 67 Fordham L Rev. 773 (1998).
17. See Austin Sarat, Enactments of Professionalismn: A Study of Judges" and Law-
yers' Accounts of Ethics and Civility in Litigation, 67 Fordham L Rev. 809, 828 (1998).
18. See Mark C. Suchman, Working Without a Net. The Sociology of Legal Ethics
in Corporate Litigation, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 837, 838 (1998).
19. See Carla Messikomer, Ambivalence, Contradiction, and Ambiguity: The Eve-
ryday Ethics of Defense Litigators, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 739 (1998).
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conduct in large firms, including firm culture, structural incentives,
and the conduct of outsiders.20
Because Ethics: Beyond the Rules is intended to be the study of
"us" by "them," we will not offer here the views of yet another "us."
What we do suggest is that the papers that follow contain some serious
concerns that must be addressed if we as lawyers are going to remain
the guardians of our system of justice. While our participants call for
more research-a suggestion we applaud-we in the profession know,
despite our often sanctimonious denials, that the problems are real
and that the solutions, which we must find ourselves, are going to
change the way we do business.
We note, however, that a better understanding of the environment
in which lawyers work can itself be illuminating. On a practical and
immediate level, we encourage lawyers, law firms, and corporate and
governmental legal departments to use these papers to spur discussion
within their own organizations. Self-examination can reinforce good
practices and identify risk areas. Ideally, regular reinforcement within
a law firm or law department of the importance of complying with
both the rules and their "spirit" should engender an environment
where the tough calls can be made in an objective and considered way.
While misconduct by lawyers may be relatively rare, we should work
to minimize its occurrence. One unfortunate case can reinforce the
cynical view many hold about the integrity of the system, ruin careers,
and tarnish an organization's standing in the community-all
unnecessarily.
Finally, the profession owes an enormous debt of gratitude to
Douglas Frenkel, Robert Gordon, Carla Messikomer, Robert Nelson,
Austin Sarat, and Mark Suchman. These talented and energetic schol-
ars stuck it out to the end, worked for a pittance, devoted hundreds of
hours each to this project, and produced readable, insightful papers.
Their real reward, however, will come if we as a profession take their
work seriously and act on it. That will require leadership, imagina-
tion, financial sacrifice, and courage. We hope we have it.
20. See Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large-Law Firm Litigators:
Preliminary Observations, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 709, 715-19 (1998).
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